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Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, 20 December 2006, requires functional foods 
manufacturers operating in Europe to provide evidence that the health claims reported on the 
packaging are truthful.  However, most applications reviewed by the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) have been rejected, leaving food manufacturers with the option of either 
selling products deprived of their claims or discontinuing their production.  This paper analyzes 
changes in welfare (both producers’ and consumers’) that would occur if the implementation of 
Reg. (EC) No 1924/2006 resulted in a large-scale health-claim de-labeling of functional food 
products.  To that end, we use one year (2007) of monthly scanner data of sales of conventional 
and functional yogurt in the Italian market and a discrete-choice random coefficient logit demand 
model which accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity using the MPEC algorithm developed by 
Dube et al. (2009) to improve numerical efficiency and accuracy, to assess the issue. Preliminary 
results show that both producers and consumers can be severely impacted if reporting health-
claims on functional products is not allowed; as our results indicate that consumers’ welfare 
losses are twice as large than producers’ a loosening of EFSA’s requirements might be required 
to avoid such losses.   
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1.  Introduction  
Among recent trends characterizing the competitive environment of modern food 
systems, food manufacturers have responded to consumers’ interest and policymakers’ pressure 
to improve the nutritional profile of their product and to invest in the development of functional 
foods
1 (Heasman and Mellentin, 200; Nestle, 2002).  The forecasted value of the global market 
for functional foods has been projected to reach $128 billion in 2013 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2009), benefitting from large growth rates, particularly in Europe: during the period 2004-2007 
such growth rate has exceeded 10% in Western Europe (The Economist, 2009) reaching in 2006 
a value of approximately US $ 8 billion (Datamonitor, 2007).  
This phenomenon has attracted the attention of academics (see Sirò et. al (2008) for a 
literature review) who have evaluated different aspects of their markets.  From the 
manufacturers’ perspective, the introduction of functional attributes comes with substantial costs 
in R&D,
 2 and with the risk of sales cannibalization (Yuan, Capps, and Nayga, 2009).  In order to 
recover the former, and to avoid the latter, food manufacturers need to successfully differentiate 
their functional products from the pre-existing conventional ones, which could eventually allow 
them to achieve higher profit margins (Bonanno, 2010).  In sum, in spite of the potential hurdles 
associated with their development, functional products present an opportunity for growth and 
revitalization of mature markets (Heasman and Mellentin, 2001). 
                                                 
1 Several definitions exist in merit to when a food product can be said to have functional attributes. See Diplock, et 
al. 1999, for an overview.  
2 According to Menrad (2003), the development of the functional yogurt Nestlé Lc1 and the proactive margarine 
Becel®, costed Unilever more than 50 million US$, twenty five times  more than the cost of developing a 
“conventional” food product.  From the consumers’ point of view, although there is evidence that some consumers 
show higher willingness to pay for food with health-enhancing features (see for example West et 
al. 2002; Markosyan et al. 2009), the role of knowledge and the reliability of the health claims 
can make a big difference in the acceptance of these products; in fact consumers’ uncertainty 
regarding functional foods’ beneficial properties have been pointed out in previous research (see 
for example, Verbeke, 2005a, 2005b) as a potential source of mistrust by consumers. In response 
manufacturers invest in informative advertising campaigns to educate the interested consumers.  
As functional products have the characteristic of credence attributes (Grunert, 2005), 
policymakers have considered taking actions to regulate their market in order to reduce 
information asymmetry and to protect consumers.  A recent development on this front is 
Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 
2006, which requires functional foods manufacturers operating in European markets to submit 
evidence (in the form of documented clinical trials) of the truthfulness of the health claims 
reported on the packaging.
3  Applications are reviewed by a panel of experts of the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) who decides on their approval.  Since November 2009, when the 
EFSA panel announced its first decisions on 523 submissions, two thirds of which were negative, 
pundits have suggested that the implementation of the Reg. (EC) No. 1924/2006 can jeopardize 
innovation and growth of the European food industry, causing job losses and consumers’ 
confusion (Starling, 2009).  For products whose submission has been rejected, health claims can 
no longer appear on the packaging; manufacturers can then either continue selling such products 
deprived of the health claim or discontinue their production. Both scenarios, likely to result in 
                                                 
3 As Svederberg and Wendin (2011) point out, the he regulation aims to reduce information asymmetry and to 
provide consumers with claims that can be better understood. As article 5:2 states:  “The use of nutrition and health 
claims shall only be permitted if the average consumer can be expected to understand the beneficial effects 
expressed in the claim” (Reg. (EC) No 1924/2006: Article 5:2). lower profits, can discourage investments in functional products and cause welfare losses for 
consumers.  In fact, the absence of health claims on the packaging may lead to confusion 
becoming less informed on relationship between health and food, an increased in the cost of the 
information (i.e. an increase in search cost) and, as food manufacturers become discouraged in 
investing in functional foods, in a decrease in the number of varieties characterized by healthy 
attributes (let alone a decline of product variety itself).  
The fact that more stringent regulation can be a deterrent for the adoption of health-
claims is not a novel concept (Parker, 2003)
 4 although there is no analysis that quantifies such 
phenomenon.  From a theoretical standpoint, Roe and Sheldon (2007) show that, in the case of 
vertically differentiated goods, if the government has the exclusive authority to certify the 
“quality” of the credence good and if the standards (in this case the EFSA protocols) are too 
strict, firms producing high-quality products (in this case health-enhancing products requiring 
R&D investments) may not be able to experience positive profits; as firms will avoid 
unprofitable products, losses in  consumers welfare  are also possible.  There is however 
evidence that reducing stringency in using health claims as marketing tools, can have an “across 
the board” benefit.
5  Ippolito and Mathios (1990) for example, analyzing the lift of the ban on 
health-claim advertising on cereals in the U.S. during the mid-80’s, found that in response to the 
lift of the ban, cereal manufacturers increased the development of fiber cereals, fiber 
consumption increased and that differences in consumption of cereals with fiber increased across 
                                                 
4  Parker (2003) illustrates that, in the U.S. market, the adoption of health claims in food advertising has been limited 
(among the other factors) by the high level of risk related to the necessity to substantiate health claims, opting for the 
less stringent procedures necessary to use structure/function claims.  Other factors are that, in the U.S., foods with a 
superior nutritionally profile (i.e. fruits and vegetables), may not be advertised as much as other (less nutritious) 
categories; and that less nutritious food, also highly advertised, are not as likely to qualify for health claims. 
5 Ippolito and Pappalardo (2002) present a thorough illustration of the effects of changes in health claim regulation 
in the U.S. during the 10-year period 1987-1997.  consumer-types, suggesting that advertising the health property of fibers, allowed consumers to 
acquire more information “cheaply”
6.   
To understand the severity of the stringency of EFSA’s protocols and the climate of 
uncertainty that has spread across food companies operating in the EU, an example may help.  
Danone (who shared its support to the new regulation with other members of the Yoghurt and 
Live Fermented Milks Association) withdrew in April 2009 two article-13.5 submissions: a 
digestive health claim for Activia (spoonable) and one immunity claim for Actimel (drinkable), 
asking the EFSA for more guidance from about scientific requirements.  The company re-
submitted an article 14 (disease reduction) claim for Actimel in August 2009 and an article 13.5 
health claim in November of the same year for Activia which were, once again, denied be the 
EFSA (Starling, 2010).  That has pushed the company to implement a “Zero Claims” policy in 
most European markets, selling both Actimel and Activia without the possibility of advertising 
their (alleged, according to the EFSA’s panel) health properties.  
Surprisingly, to date, very little attention has been given to understand the welfare 
implications for both consumers and producers resulting from the existence of functional 
attributes in a given product category, and, as a consequence, of the changes in welfare that 
could occur in response to the stringent approach that the EFSA is taking in reviewing health 
claims.  Such an empirical investigation could provide critical information to policy makers in 
Europe as well as for those considering the implementation of similar regulations elsewhere.   
This paper uses the Italian yogurt market as a case study to evaluate welfare changes that 
both manufacturer and consumers would experience if ALL functional yogurts in this market 
                                                 
6 Another point that Ippolito and Mathios (1990) make is that, as individual consumers may value health differently, 
they will be willing to incur different costs to obtain information regarding the health content of foods.  
Furthermore, the type of information provided to consumer could have unintended consequences.  Some evidence 
exists that, in the U.S. in periods when nutrient content information was readily available to consumers via 
advertising, awareness of diet-disease relationships declined (Teisl, Levy, and Derby 1999). were sold without advertising the presence of a health-enhancing functional component, i.e. a 
“full health-claims de-labeling”, as extreme outcome of the stringency of EFSA’s review 
protocols.  The Italian yogurt market is chosen as a case study due to the fact that yogurt 
manufacturers operating in Italy have heavily invested in developing and marketing functional 
products and that, as illustrated above, their operations have been drastically impacted by the 
stringency of Reg. (EC) No. 1924/2006.  
The data used are one year (Jan 2007 – Dec. 2007) of monthly observations of yogurt 
sales for 64 products (48 conventional and 16 functional) sold in thirteen Italian regions.  The 
demand model used is discrete-choice random coefficient logit model (Berry, Levisohn, and 
Pakes, 1995; hereafter BLP; Nevo, 2001, Petrin, 2002), which, by incorporating consumer 
heterogeneity via random terms, allows for a flexible substitution patterns.  The model is 
estimated via Generalized Method of Moments with the MPEC algorithm, to improve the 
numerical efficiency and accuracy of the nested fixed point algorithm in obtaining the BLP 
estimator (Dube et al.; 2009), accounting also for endogeneity of prices.  The supply-side of the 
model sees firms deciding prices in the short-run and product formulations in the log-run. 
Preliminary results presented show that both Italian yogurt manufacturers and consumers 
could be severely impacted by the implementation of a full ban on health claims.  As consumers 
may seek additional value in functional yogurts, which is shown through the lower own-price 
elasticities of demand for these products, and manufactures benefit from higher margins by 
investing in these products, the losses for both parties can be substantial.  While the Italian 
yogurt industry could have lost, in the year 2007, -114.40 million Euro in profit, if the full de-
labeling had been in place, consumer’s welfare would have decreased by twice as much, or by -
229 million Euros.  
2.  The Model  
2.1 The Demand Side  
Consider t markets ( t = 1,…,T  ), each with i consumers  (i = 1,…,It  ),  whose utility 
from consuming the j-th alternative of yogurt  (j = 1,…,Jt  ) is represented as  
ijt i jt j i j ijt u p X e a b x = - + + +
             
(1) 
where pjt is the price of alternative j , faced by all consumers in market t, Xj is a K-dimensional 
vector of observable characteristics of product j,  i a
 
and  i b
 
are, respectively consumer i’s taste 
parameter for price and a conformable vector of taste parameters for the observable product 
characteristic;  j x is a random term characterizing unobserved product characteristics and and eijt 
is a mean-zero stochastic error term.  
We characterize consumers’ heterogeneity in equation (1) assuming that consumer value 
all product attributes equally, except in the case of price and of a “functional attribute” (defined 
as 
H
j X ).  In general terms,
H
j X  could either be continuous or discrete, as it could represent both 
the content of a nutrient whose concentration results in some particular health benefit (i.e. fiber, 
density of a particular vitamin etc…) or discrete (i.e. presence of a beneficial, probiotic  bacteria 
etc…).  Equation (1) can then be rewritten as:    
r rH H H
ijt jt j j i jt i j ijt jt ijt ijt u p X p X e e a b x a n b n d m = - + + - + + = + +
   
(2) where the term  jt jt j j p X d a b x = - + +  is referred to as the mean utility of alternative j, while  
ijt ijt e m +  is a deviation from the mean utility which includes random terms to capture consumers 
taste heterogeneity, or
 
r rH H H
ijt i jt i j p X m a n b n = - + .
7   
As Berry (1994) and BLP (1995) show, the estimation of an econometric model derived 
from equations similar to (2), cannot be treated with standard econometric techniques.  To obtain 
an estimable form of (2), we first assume that the term eijt is distributed extreme-value type 1 
independently across consumers and products, so that the probability of consumer i in market t 
choosing alternative j, conditionally on the random terms  i n  and 
H
i n  i.e. the market share 






r rH H H
jt j j i jt i j
j t t J r rH H H
jt j j i jt i j j
p X p X
f X p
p X p X
a b x a n b n
d q
a b x a n b n
=
- + + - +
=
+ - + + - + ∑
 
(3)    
where q is a vector including all the parameters in the model.  Second, one needs to integrate 
equation (3) over the distribution of the random terms P n : 
( ) ( ) , , ; , , , ( , , ), , , ( )
H
t t t j i i jt j s X p P f X p X p P dv n n d q n n d x q =∫      (4)  
As Berry (1994), BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001) discuss, such integral has no closed form 
solution.  However, using appropriate assumptions on the form of the unobserved heterogeneity, 
one can set up an “updating rule” so that the simulated shares form equation (4) will match the 
ones observed in the data (see Nevo, (2001) for a detailed illustration of the nested fixed point 
algorithm developed by BLP (1995), or the recent MPEC algorithm, developed by Dube et al. 
                                                 
7 The role of last term in the mean utility, the product-specific unobservable  j x , is crucial as it will become the 
structural error used in the implementation of the estimation procedure (Generalized Method of Moments; see the 
“Data and Estimation” section for more details). (2009)).  More details on the estimation procedure are presented in the “Data and Estimation” 
Section.  
 
2.2 The Supply Side 
The supply-side of the model follows a setup consistent with firms adopting a two-stage 
decision process (a’ la Sutton, 1998), where yogurt manufacturers’ decide whether or not 
investing in the formulation of new products (investment stage) and then compete with the other 
firms in the market in the second stage (competition stage).   
For simplicity of exposition, the competition stage will be solved first, and the problem in 
the investment stage will be solved second.  Let Jn be the set of yogurts produced by 
manufacturer n. Assume manufacturer n maximizes its profits by jointly setting prices for all the 
products it produces (the market-specific index t is dropped for simplicity):   
    max ( ) ;
j
n
n j j j j p
j J
M S p c F p
Î
= - - ∑
         
  (5) 
 
where M is the size of the total market, cj is product j’s (constant) short-run marginal cost and Fj 
is its long-run cost of product development (or reformulation), which, in this stage is assumed to 
be fixed.  Following Nevo (2001), and assuming that prices are the outcome of a Nash-Bertrand 
equilibrium, the optimization problem in (5) leads to a vector of FOCs which can be expressed 
as:   
 
1 (.) p c S
- - = -W                 (6)  
Where p – c is a vector of price-cost margins, S(.) is a vector of market shares, and each element 
of the matrix W is defined as   
 
*
jk jk jk W =W D , where 






if k j J S
otherwise p
Î ¶ 
W = D =  ¶ 
.  (7) In the context of a multi-product Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, 
* W  represents the 
ownership matrix, while the elements of D  are partial derivatives of demand with respect to the 
vector of prices.  Equation (6) defines implicitly the Price Cost Margin (PCM) of each product
n j J Î .  Following Nevo (2001), one can obtain different values of the PCMs combining the 
estimated parameters from equation (4) with different structures of 
* W .  The structure of the 
ownership matrix chosen is such to impose product –line pricing (following Draganska and 
Jain’s (2006) result), and assuming the existence of two broad product-lines, conventional and 
functional (
* 1 jk W = , , n j k J " Î   =0
H H
j k X X - ).  
In the long-run food manufacturers invest in revising or updating the formulation of their 
products by means of investments in R&D (the inclusion of advertising cost to promote the 
improvement of the products is a simple extension of the model and it will not be explicitly 
considered).  Let hj, an unspecified, general measure of product quality (obtained through R&D 
investment) of product j be the decision variable in this stage.  The long-run optimization 
problem of manufacturer n is:  
  max ( ) ;
j
n
n j j j j h
j J
M S p c F p
Î
= - - ∑
           
(8)
 
which leads to the following FOC  
( ) ( ) 0
j j j j j j k
j j j j j
j j j j k k k k k k k
S S p c F p
p c p c S
h h p h h h h
p ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   ¶













 i.e. where the cost structure and the ability to raise price above 
costs will be impacted only for those products whose formulation is actually changing.  
Using the notation above, the system of Jn FOCs can be rewritten in matrix form as:    ( )' ( )' (.) (.) 0 p c p c S S c i F - W + - WL + L - Ñ - Ñ =
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and i is a conformable row-vector of 1s.  
Using the assumption of the existence of a multi-product Nash-Bertrand short-run 
equilibrium, i.e. equation (6), one has
1 [ ]' [ (.)]' (.) p c S S
- - WL = -W WL = - L, which, substituted 
into equation (10) gives the optimal long-run decision of manufacturers in terms of formulation.  
  1 [ (.)]' (.) S S c i F
- W W = Ñ + Ñ               (11)
 
Equation (11) depicts the long-run optimal condition for a manufacturer to change the 
formulation of their products.  Equation (11) will not be estimated, however the optimality  he 
matrix of the own- and cross-price demand derivatives can be estimated from equation (3) and 
the  jk X can be simulated imposing manufacturers to change their formulation and then 
recalculating equilibrium prices and shares, one can obtain an estimate of the shadow value of 
including functionality in a product.  
 
2.3 Simulating the impact of Reg. (EC) No. 1924/2006. 
In order to calculate the effect of full de-labeling on producers and consumers, we follow 
an approach similar to those used by Petrin (2002) and Ackerberg and Rysman (2005).  In the 
first place, once all the parameters of the demand equation in (3) are obtained, we artificially set
0
H
j X =  across all functional products; i.e. consumers will no longer be able to obtain the 
necessary information on the health content of the products.  This scenario simulates the 
rejection by EFSA of all health claims’ submission presented.  In order to simulate such scenario, we first invert equation (6) and solve for the vector of 
short-run marginal cost of production and calculate a new value of market shares S
del.  Thus, 
using the artificial shares, we solve the non-linear system of equation in (6) to obtain a new 
vector of equilibrium prices p
del; both S
del a and p
del are obtained considering a manipulated 
choice set where all functional yogurts in the market are deprived of the possibility to advertise 
their health claims.   
Let  S
0 and p
0 be, respectively, the equilibrium price and share’s vector that one observers 
before perturbing the equilibrium; for each of the n yogurt manufacturer we calculate  
0 0 ( ) ( ) ( )
n
del del del
n j j j j j j
j J
SR M S p c S p c p
Î
    D = - - -  
    ∑          (12)  
which represents the Short-Run total changes in producers’ profits due to the full enforcement of  
health-claims’ de-labeling as consequence of implementation of Reg. (EC) No. 1924/2006.  The 
long-run equilibrium considered in equation (11) could also be used to obtain the shadow price 
of investing in functional attributes.  That would be useful if simulating changes in profits under 
another extreme outcome of the implementation of Reg. (EC) No. 1924/2006, i.e. the 
disappearance of all functional alternatives from the marketplace, which would leave 
manufacturers unable to recover pre-existing investments in R&D and advertisement, analysis 
which is not developed here.   
To complete the evaluation of the effects of full de-labeling we also simulate changes in 
consumers’ surplus under.  Having obtained estimates of the demand parameters, we can 
calculate the level of unconditional utility for consumer i as  exp( ) ijt jt ijt V d m = + .  Following 
McFadden (1981), one could obtain a value of equivalent variation (EV) by dividing the 
difference of baseline indirect utility minus that of the de-labeling scenario for each individual by the estimated price coefficient from the demand model.  Averaging over all consumers (i.e. using 
the sample analog of integrating over the random parameter’s distributions) and using similar 
notation of that in equation (12), the average equivalent variation for a consumer after full de-














+ ∑                (13)  
where a is the mean of the estimated price parameter from equation (3), 
r a is the coefficient of 
the random component associated with it and m is the number of random draws of vi from its 
distribution Pv.  
 
3.  Data and Estimation 
3.1 Data and Variables Description  
We estimate the random coefficient discrete choice demand model using a proprietary 
scanner dataset provided by the Food Marketing Policy Centre at the University of Connecticut
8 
supplied originally by Information Resources Incorporated (IRI).  The database includes 12 
monthly observations of yogurt sales (quantities and values) for the period January 2007 – 
December 2007 in Hyper- and Super-markets located in thirteen Italian IRI regions covering 
most of the national territory.
9 The data contains yogurt sales for 64 products (48 conventional 
and 16 functional), for major leading vendors of yogurts operating in the Italian market (Danone, 
Granarolo/Yomo, Nestle, Mila, Muller, Parmalat, Vipiteno, Private Label, 
 referred below as 
brands), discriminating for flavor (plain, fruit, and other flavors), fat content (skim and whole), 
                                                 
8 Ronald W. Cotterill, director of the Food Marketing Policy Center is thankfully acknowledged for granting access 
to the IRI data.  
9 Some of the regions were excluded as their market is characterized by prevalence of local brands, suggesting that 
the choice set for consumers in those regions could be substantially different than in the rest of the Italian territory. 
The regions excluded are Sicilia, Sardinia, Calabria+Basilicata and Trentino Alto Adige.  consistency (drinkable versus non-drinkable) and the presence of functional attributes, for a total 
of 9,800 observations.  Volume and value of sales are used to calculate prices in €/Kg.   
Following Di Giacomo (2008), the size of the potential yogurt market is calculated assuming that 
each consumer in each region consumes one serving – i.e. 125 grams – of yogurt daily.  The total 
number of resident population in each region is obtained from the Annuario Statistico Italiano of 
the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), which is then multiplied by 0.125 and by the number 
of days in each IRI “month.”  The total (potential) market is then used to calculate each product 
market share of each alternative, along with the outside share for each market.  
The product characteristics other than price and the functional indicator included in the 
demand equation are an indicator of fat content (whole), one of “plain” flavor, one for drinkable 
yogurts, two for fruit flavors (with pieces of fruit and with pulp) and brand indicators (the 
excluded one being Private Labels). 
Table 1 presents average prices (€/serving) and market shares for the 64 products used in 
the estimation. From the data in Table 1 it emerges that Danone is, the leader in the Italian yogurt 
market.  However, although its position is clear among functional yogurts, among conventional 
ones, the situation is more mixed.  For example Private Labels and Granarolo compete for the 
predominance among the “Fruit with pulp” yogurt, Private Labels and Danone compete for that 
in “fruit with pieces” ones, while Granarolo seems to dominate that of flavored ones.  With 
respect to prices, yogurt manufacturer seem to use substantially similar prices across flavors 
(with the exception of Muller and Nestle).  Also, while the market leaders seem to benefit from 
their position by charging higher prices (on average 0.59 €/serving Danone, 0.39 €/serving 
Parmalat, 0.49 €/serving Granarolo, 0.44 €/serving Muller), the other vendors price their 
products at levels that are close to the PLs’ prices (average price of Mila’s product 0.34 €/serving; Vipiteno’s 0.32 €/serving; PLs’ ranging from 0.29 to 0.37 € /serving) or that, vice 
versa, PLs could perhaps compete more heavily with those brands.  Lastly, Danone and 
Parmalat, price their functional alternatives at higher than their conventional ones (average price 
of Danone’s functional is 0.64 €/serving; Parmalat’s 0.58 €/serving) while both Nestle’s and 
Granarolo’s (Yomo) conventional fruit flavored alternatives (and drinkable in the case of Nestle) 
show similar prices across product lines.   
 
3.2 Estimation and Identification Strategy 
Following Berry (1994) and BLP (1995) we estimate the demand using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM).  The population moment condition exploited in the GMM is that 
the product of exogenous instrument variables with the structural error term in equation (2) is 
zero.  Following Nevo (2001) let’s define the vector of exogenous instruments as Z = [z1, … zM]. 
This vector satisfies  [ ' ( *)] 0 E Z w q =  where  ( *) w q  is a function of the true values of the 
parameters of the model  * q  which, in our case is equivalent to the product-specific 
unobservable  j x . The vector of GMM estimates ɵ q solves:  
ɵ 1 argmin ( )' ' ( ) ZA Z
q
q w q w q
- =           (14) 
where A is a consistent estimate of  [ ' ' ] E Z Z ww = .  In order to solve equation (14) one needs to 
calculate the vector of unobserved characteristics  j x  by means of obtaining values of the mean 
utility  t d  so that the market share functions, as described in equation (4), and the observed 
market shares are equal or  that  ( ) , , ; (.) t t t t s X p S d q = , which requires numerical methods.
10   
                                                 
10 Simpler specifications of how consumers’ heterogeneity enters equation (1) lead to closed form solutions of the 
market share function in equation (4).  That is if the only source of heterogeneity was the extreme-value type I The estimation of the demand equation is performed using the MPEC algorithm 
developed by Dube et al. (2009) using the optimization package TOMLAB-KNITRO.  Dube et 
al. (2009) show that the nested fixed point algorithm (also known as nested contracting mapping 
algorithm) to solve for the market share function, developed by Berry (1994) and BLP (1995) is 
susceptible to numerical issues due to nested calls to an inner loop,  such as inefficiency and 
failure to navigate to global minimum. They propose MPEC as a new computational algorithm 
for implementing the BLP estimator. This new algorithm recasts BLP’s GMM objective function 
as a mathematical program with equality constraint (thus the name MPEC), and hence 
circumventing the need of nested inner loops and their associated numerical issues. They show 
through numerical theory and Monte Carlo simulations that MPEC could significantly improve 
numerical efficiency and accuracy.    
The GMM estimator explicitly accounts for the potential price endogeneity by the uses of 
instrumental variables.  To this end, we use cost-variables related to manufacturing and retailing 
costs of yogurt.  Variations in these cost variables are correlated with variations in prices but 
uncorrelated with unobserved demand shocks.  Since all the vendors considered in the analysis 
operate on a national scale, part of our identification strategy aims to use variation in yogurt 
prices that is unlikely to be correlated with regional shocks which could, in principle, impact 
both demand and supply.  To that end we use the following input prices as instruments for retail 
yogurt prices: farm-level milk price (national, monthly, €/l),  price of nuts the origin (national, 
monthly, €/kg), farm-level, national price of fruit (national, monthly, €/kg), from the DATIMA 
database of the Istituto per lo Studio dei Mercati Agricoli (ISMEA) and the European import 
price (CIF) of sugar (national, monthly, US $/lb), by Index Mundi.  Additionally we control for 
                                                                                                                                                           
random component eijt , the mean utility δijt will be equal to ln(Sjt) - ln(S0t) which results in the multi-nomial logit 
demand model.  differences in retailing costs, by means of retail workers’ per capita earnings (regional, annual, € 
.000) by the Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Osservatorio Italiano del Commercio.   
 
4.  Empirical Results and Discussion  
4.1 Estimated Parameters and Elasticitities 
The results of the estimation of equation (4) are presented in Table 2.  Along with the 
estimates of the Radom Coefficient Logit, reported in the last column on the right, the results of 
two Multi-Nomial Logits (MNL) are also reported: a “naïve” model where endogeneity of prices 
is not accounted for (column “OLS”) and one where endogeneity is instead controlled for 
(column “2SLS”).  In spite of the low R-squared, the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% 
level (statistic not reported); also, the p-value of the Sargan test is close to 0.1, suggesting 
orthogonality of the overidentifying instruments; lastly, the value of the F-statistics for the joint 
significance of the instruments in the first state regression exceeds the “rule-of-thumb” value of 
10 indicated by Stagier and Stock (1997), ruling out the presence of weak instruments problems.  
The most considerable differences in estimated coefficients across models are in the 
coefficients of price and functional indicators.
11  The mean of the estimated price parameter in 
the random coefficient model is approximately -8.62, while the random component of the price 
coefficient (i.e. variation from the mean) is 4.03; both coefficients being significant at the 1% 
level.  This result indicates that taste heterogeneity does in fact play a considerable role in 
impacting consumers’ price sensitivity in the Italian yogurt market.  The empirical distribution of 
the random price coefficient is reported in the left panel of Figure1; from such distribution 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the results discussed are obtained from a model including a random coefficient for the 
“Fruit with pulp” attribute.  We experimented with different specifications of the model, including different random 
parameters for different attributes, obtaining, in most cases qualitatively similar results.  Allowing for random 
coefficients for all the product attributes was unfeasible due to the excessive computation time and power required.    (centered at -8.6), it can be noted that, although most of the values are in the negative range, the 
left tail of the distribution includes some positive values of the price coefficients.  
The mean of the estimated coefficient of the functional indicator is approximately 0.43 
(statistically significant at the 1% level), while the coefficient of the random component 
associated with it is small (-0.055), and not statistically significant, indicating that consumers’ 
taste for the functional attribute, is not characterized by substantial heterogeneity.  Given the 
narrow distribution of this parameter, as illustrated in the right panel in Figure 1, no consumers 
will be likely to show a negative attitude towards functionality.  
With respect to the coefficients of the other attributes the “plain” indicator shows 
negative and statistically significant coefficients in all estimated models, suggesting that, on 
average Italian yogurt consumers appreciate flavored yogurts more than others.  In fact the fruit 
indicators are both positive, similar to the coefficient of the drinkable attribute.  In terms of the 
estimated coefficients for the vendor indicators, those of Danone and Muller are positive and 
significant across models, while those of Parmalat, Mila, Parmalat, Granarolo, and Vipiteno 
show negative and statistically significant sign.  
The median of the distributions of the estimated own-price elasticities obtained using the 
estimated parameters of the random coefficient logit are reported in Table 3.  The values range 
from -0.79 (Danone Plain Functional whole) to -2.94 (Parmalat, Fruit with Pulp, Conventional 
Skim) for an average value of -1.64.  These values are reasonable and are consistent with the 
values reported by Di Giacomo (2008) in her analysis of the demand for yogurt in the Italian 
market, ranging from -0.88 to -2.66.   
Overall, five patterns emerge from the values in Table 3:  1  Functional vs. conventional:  Functional yogurts show lower values of own-price elasticities 
than their conventional counterparts, across brands, flavors, and fat content.  This result 
corroborates previous findings that consumers show higher willingness to pay for products 
with health enhancing features (see for example West et al. 2002; Markosyan et al. 2009) 
and that the demand for functional products tends to be less elastic than for conventional 
ones (Bonanno, 2010).   
2  Drinkable: the demand for drinkable conventional products appears to be more inelastic than 
that for other conventional alternatives, while it is not clear whether this holds as well for 
functional products, given the very small values of estimated elasticities for Danone’s 
spoonable functional yogurts.    
3  Brand (vendor): the demand for Danone’s yogurts tends to be less elastic than that for other 
brands, across flavors, fat content and functional properties, with the exception of the 
drinkable whole functional alternatives, where the demand for Danone’s products appear the 
most elastic, perhaps due to its high prices.  
3  Flavors: the demand for fruit flavored yogurts shows (on average) higher values of elasticity 
than that for other flavors (at times comparable) and plain, in particular that of “fruit with 
pulp” alternatives, which show the largest values of elasticity.  
4  Fat content: no unique trend emerges with respect to fat content and; while the demand for 
whole alternatives seems to be more elastic than for light ones, among plain, fruit flavored 
(with the exception of the functional alternatives), and drinkable ones, the demand for the 
light alternatives appear more elastic among some Private Labels.  
A summary of the elasticities by brand and by presence of functional attributes, along 
with profit margins calculated as in equation (6) is presented in table 4.  Besides corroborating what illustrated above – Danone’s products benefiting from lower values of elasticity of demand, 
and that functional products dhow less elastic demand than conventional ones – the results 
illustrate also that the price cost margins for the functional products are 9 % (in the case of  
Granarolo) to 32 % ( in the case of Parmalat) higher than for their conventional counterparts.  
Although the estimated average margins appear large (as large as 90%), the reader should keep 
in mind that these are short-run margins and that they do not take into account the presence of 
fixed costs. Interestingly the profit margins of all manufacturers that have not ventured in the 
production of functional products show similar PCMs, the lowest of which is registered for 
Private Labels (55.15%), which may perhaps indicate a lack of brand image for those 
manufacturers that appear “less-differentiated” resulting in lower margins.  
In sum, the results illustrated so far indicate that, as Italian consumers appear less price 
sensitive for functional yogurts, food manufacturers may see the development of functional 
alternatives as an opportunity to differentiate their products and benefit from higher margins.  If 
that is the case, the potential losses that they could incur if de-labeling is enforced could be 
severe.  The results discussed in the next section provide evidence to support this intuition.  
 
4.2 Impact of De-labeling on Firms’ Performance and Consumers’ Welfare 
Table 5 presents the results of the counterfactual analysis simulating the impact of full 
de-labeling enforced by the EFSA on yogurt manufacturers operating in Italy.
12  In the first 
place, the market leader of functional yogurts, Danone, would experience a loss of 19% in shares 
of functional products and only a 1.19% of that of conventional ones.  The outcome of full de-
labeling would therefore be that of the company having to lower considerably the prices of the 
                                                 
12 The results presented in Table 5 are obtained excluding counterfactual price and shares measure for some of the 
drinkable alternatives, as the measures resulting from the simulation of de-labeling for these products were too large 
and therefore unrealistic. conventional products to avoid losing market shares, since the new equilibrium price of 
conventional yogurts will drop more than those of conventional one).  Overall, Danone’s short-
run profits in 2007 would have decreased by approximately 64 million Euros, or almost one 
fourth of its total profitability, if full de-labeling had been in place.  
Other yogurt manufacturers would have fared better than Danone.  Granarolo, who would 
have been forced to exit the market of functional yogurts, could have more than compensated the 
losses from that front thanks to higher profits in the conventional segment, and overall, increase 
its profits, while Parmalat, would have been able to replenish the losses from the functional 
segment with some gains from the conventional one.  Nestle (who could have benefited from 
higher prices in the conventional segment) would have also incurred a substantial loss, in the 
order of approximately 20 million Euros.  Interestingly, our counterfactual predicts losses also 
for manufacturers who do not produce functional yogurts, in particular for Vipiteno and Private 
Labels.  This result comes from the higher equilibrium prices and lower shares, which are 
perhaps the result of changes in the composition of their consumer base.  As some consumers 
attracted by functional product may lose interest in de-labeled products, manufacturers of 
functional alternatives will lower their price with the result of price sensitive consumers 
perceiving the un-labeled functional products now more appealing to them.  This could result in 
the same less price sensitive consumers to lower their consumption of conventional product 
which could, in turn impact the profits of manufacturers who avoided investing in functional 
alternatives.    
The overall losses in producers’ profit due to a full enforcement of de-labeling are 
estimated in 114 million Euros, or approximately 14%.  More than half of this loss would come 
from Danone, approximately 20% from Nestle, and 23 percent from Vipiteno and Private Labels combined, which would see their position of low-priced alternative being jeopardized by the 
lower prices of the de-labeled functional alternatives.  
The estimated impact of full health-claim de-labeling on consumers’ welfare is calculated 
using equation (13), whose values are reported in table 6.  First, the values of the simulated 
individual consumers’ utility shows that the average difference in indirect utility would on 
average be 0.072, resulting in cumulative decrease in utility of approximately 27% among 
consumers.  In order to show how these differences in utilities differ across heterogeneous 
consumers, the ratio exp(Ui
0)/exp(Ui
del) was calculated and its distribution plotted in Figure 2. 
From that histogram, it clearly emerges that most consumers show larger level of utility when 
they are able to observe health claims of the product they buy (the mean value of the ratio being 
1.43).   
Table 6.  Impact of health-claims de-labeling on consumers – utility and Welfare  
 




          exp(Ui
de)-exp(Ui
0)  999  -0.0722  1.5413  -43.06  1.4765 
 
Daily Individual Welfare Loss   999  -0.0137  0.2771  -6.0596  1.9586 
 
Annual Average Individual Welfare Loss   -4.9972 
       
Total Welfare Losses   -228.797 
     
           
 
 
The resulting average welfare loss for each consumer is of approximately -0.0137 € daily, 
or approximately 5 € per year, which, aggregating over consumers in the 13 regions considered 
(market size is 45,784,960 people) results of an overall welfare effect of the full de-labeling 
simulation of approximately -228.8 million €, which would be twice as the losses in profits. Therefore, if the EFSA was operative in 2007, and if it had rejected all health claims among 
functional yogurts in the Italian markets, the total deadweight losses would have been of 343 
million Euros.  
The result that consumers would have been twice as worse off as manufacturers, should 
however be taken with caution.  In fact, our counterfactual assumes that consumers derive zero 
utility from the presence of a functional attribute once health claims are removed from label and 
packages.  It is likely, especially in the immediate aftermath of the removal, that consumers still 
know and thus enjoys the presence of functional attributes, even if these are not acknowledged in 
the labels (that is, there will be some utility associated with the functional attribute).  Hence, our 
welfare estimate should be viewed as an upper bound of consumer welfare loss.   
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
As the market for health-enhancing food products expands, policymakers have 
considered updating regulatory schemes about health-claims on food products, so to improve 
transparency and reduce the risk of asymmetric information between consumers and producers.  
A recent regulation of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006, dictates the submission of documented 
clinical trials by food manufacturers that want to have health claims on their products.  The 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), in charge of reviewing such submission, has adopted a 
rather stringent approach, rejecting the majority of application.  Some pundits sustain that such 
approach could jeopardize innovation and growth of the European food industry as a whole.  
Excessive stringency could also hurt consumers, as search cost to obtain information on health properties of foods will increase, and product variety could also decrease (if manufacturers lose 
interests in investing in functional products).   
As food manufacturers whose application to carry a health-claim are rejected by the 
EFSA can still sell their products but without reporting the claims on the packaging, we used a 
case-study approach and analyzed changes in producers’ profits and consumers’ welfare that 
could occur if all functional yogurts present in the Italian market were to be sold without health-
claims on their packaging.  In this preliminary work we illustrate the results of a counterfactual 
analysis for a “full de-labeling” scenario using demand estimates for conventional and functional 
alternatives yogurts in Italy obtained via a model which accounts for consumers’ taste 
heterogeneity (mixed logit).  The estimated losses from health-claims de-labeling could be 
substantial, which, for the year 2007, could have results in potential losses of 114 million Euros 
of yogurt manufacturers’ profits (more than half if it coming from the market leader, Danone) 
and twice as large losses (229 million Euros circa) in consumers’ welfare.  Although the latter 
figure is an upper bound, as consumers may still achieve some satisfaction from the presence of 
functional attributes, even if not advertised, our results indicate that there is, at least potentially, a 
concrete risk that both manufacturers and consumers could be substantially hurt – especially the 
former – by an excessive stringency of the implementation of Reg (EC) No. 1924/2006.  
The analysis presented here is preliminary, as it does not account for changes in long-run 
profitability due to changes in fixed-cost related to R&D and/or advertising which are substantial 
in the market of health-enhancing food products.  Also, a different, more severe outcome of Reg 
(EC) No. 1924/2006 would be that of food manufacturers discontinuing the production of 
functional alternatives.  In order to simulate changes in producers’ profits and consumers’ 
welfare one should account for both the impossibility of recovering pre-existing R&D costs  (on the producers’ side) and the decrease in the number of varieties in the market (on the consumers’ 
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Table 1 – Average Price and Market Shares (%) – Annual Average (2007) across 13 IRI Italian Regions 
      Danone  Parmalat  Granarolo  Nestle  Mila  Muller  Vipiteno  PL 
Conventional  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share  Price  Share 
Plain  Skim  0.57  0.058  0.50  0.037      0.33  0.015  0.42  0.073  0.31  0.082  0.30  0.188 
Whole  0.55  0.030  0.46  0.051  0.36  0.104  0.31  0.086  0.31  0.184 
Fruit  Skim  0.68  0.002  0.36  0.069      0.35  0.121 
(Pulp)  Whole  0.58  0.051  0.38  0.259  0.53  0.551  0.65  0.086  0.31  0.086  0.41  0.030  0.32  0.335  0.32  0.332 
Fruit  Skim  0.55  0.532  0.49  0.059  0.38  0.049  0.34  0.112  0.52  0.102  0.32  0.057  0.35  0.210 
(Pieces)  Whole  0.52  0.004  0.40  0.083  0.41  0.092      0.34  0.069  0.42  0.086  0.32  0.043  0.29  0.207 
   
Other    Skim  0.60  0.069  0.37  0.027 
Whole  0.43  0.026  0.57  0.327      0.33  0.063  0.45  0.004  0.33  0.127  0.32  0.127 
Drink     0.56  0.074  0.64  0.019  0.41  0.104  0.49  0.242 
Functional  
Plain  Skim  0.63  0.068 
Whole  0.60  0.119 
Unsp  0.58  0.016 
Fruit  Skim  0.62  0.106 
Whole  0.62  0.403  0.56  0.006 
Other  Skim  0.66  0.027  0.54  0.006 
Whole  0.64  0.533  0.59  0.072 
Drink  Skim  0.68  0.181  0.60  0.044     
Whole  0.67  0.696  0.65  0.049  0.61  0.200  0.60  0.026 
Note: Prices are expressed in (€/serving); Serving size = 125 gr.  
Market shares are calculated using an estimated total market resulting from the daily consumption of 125gr of product per person  
Table 2 Estimated Demand Parameters 
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Fruit Pulp  0.550  ***  0.539  ***  -10.647  ***  -7.832  *** 
  (0.044)    (0.045)    (0.036)    (0.019)   
Fruit Pieces  0.167  ***  0.051    0.218  ***     
  (0.043)    (0.065)    (0.001)       
Whole  0.709  ***  0.655  ***  0.741  ***     
  (0.028)    (0.036)    (0.000)       
Plain   -0.154  ***  -0.254  ***  -0.113  ***     
  (0.040)    (0.058)    (0.000)       









   
 









   
 
Granarolo  -0.056 
 









   
 









   
 
Nestle  -0.247  **  0.300 
 
-0.275 








   
 









   
 









   
 









   
 









   
 
               
 
Observations  9,800 
 
9,800 
       
 
R-squared  0.231 
 
0.216 










     
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Instruments for price:  farm-level milk price, FOB sugar price, farm-level fruit 
price; average nut prices; retail earnings. 
   Table 3 – Median estimated own-price elasticities (t-statistics in parenthesis)   
      Danone  Parmalat  Granarolo  Nestle  Mila  Muller  Vipiteno  PL 
Conventional  Elast  (t-stat)  Elast  (t-stat)  Elast  (t-stat)  Elast  (t- stat)  Elast  (t-stat)  Elast  (t-stat)  Elast  (t- stat)  Elast  (t-stat) 
Plain  Skim  -1.32  (3.11)  -1.54  (5.53)      -1.70  (15.32)  -1.70  (9.51)  -1.68  (15.99)  -1.67  (16.86) 
Whole  -1.40  (5.37)  -1.64  (7.98)      -1.70  (12.43)  -1.68  (15.65)  -1.67  (15.40) 
Fruit -  Skim  -1.98  (4.83)  -2.94  (19.03)  -2.91  (19.80) 
Pulp  Whole  -2.51  (10.71)  -2.83  (10.08)  -2.37  (28.11)  -2.15  (7.62)  -2.78  (14.85)  -2.89  (23.90)  -2.56  (13.26)  -2.56 
 
(17.49) 
Fruit -  Skim  -1.40  (4.22)      -1.57  (7.45)  -1.71  (12.32)  -1.70  (14.13)  -1.53  (5.25)  -1.69  (14.04)  -1.71  (13.52) 
Pieces  Whole  -1.47  (4.79)  -1.71  (13.52)  -1.71  (9.76)      -1.70  (13.91)  -1.69  (9.74)  -1.69  (12.73)  -1.63  (15.37) 
Other    Skim  -1.19  (2.69)  -1.72  (12.11) 
Whole  -1.68  (10.10)  -1.31  (5.46)      -1.70  (14.02)  -1.65  (8.46)  -1.70  (14.42)  -1.58  (6.66) 
Drink     -1.04  (1.95)  -1.71  (10.72)  -1.17  (2.95)  -1.58  (6.66) 
 Functional 
Plain  Skim  -0.79  (1.76) 
Whole  -1.04  (2.31) 
Unsp  -1.27  (3.50) 
Fruit  Skim  -1.36  (4.11) 
Whole  -0.90  (2.28)  -1.36  (3.89) 
Other  Skim  -1.16  (2.52)  -1.50  (4.07) 
Whole  -0.93  (1.64)  -1.26  (3.46) 
Drink  Skim  -0.90  (2.28)  -0.94  (2.11)     







Table 4 – Summary of Elasticities and Price Cost Margins (PCM) 
across brands and functional attributes 
  
         
Vendor  Attribute   Elasticity  PCM  %PCM 
         
 
Danone  Conventional  -1.54  0.43  64.75 
 
Functional  -1.07  0.64  88.33 
          Granarolo   Conventional  -1.69  0.35  62.22 
   Functional   -1.50  0.44  71.30 
          Mila  Conventional  -1.88  0.22  55.81 
 
Functional  -1.50  0.50  72.95 
          Nestle  Conventional  -1.68  0.47  71.94 
 
Functional  -1.04  0.62  89.80 
          Parmalat  Conventional  -2.29  0.22  48.16 
 
Functional  -1.30  0.53  80.37 
          Muller  Conventional  -1.82  0.30  58.92 
          Vipiteno  Conventional  -1.83  0.21  56.71 
          PLs  Conventional  -1.93  0.21  55.15 
          
Table 5 – Impact of de-labeling of health claims on functional yogurts on profits and welfare  
 
         Price (€/serving)  Market Share (%)  SR  π
del (eq.12) 
Vendor  Attribute   
P










 0  π
 del   π
del 
Danone  Conventional  0.66  0.59  -10.61  0.1  0.13  -1.19  59.37  58.66  -0.71 
 
Functional  0.72  0.65  -9.05  0.21  0.15  -26.24  178.25  117.87  -60.37 
                        Granarolo   Conventional  0.56  0.56  -0.5  0.19  0.21  1.09  87.06  96.15  9.09 
   Functional  0.61  0.55  -11.12  0.01  0.00  -100  3.71  0.00  -3.71 
                        Mila  Conventional  0.39  0.59  54.53  0.09  0.05  -45.54  25.28  27.80  2.52 
 
Functional  0.69  0.63  -9.04  0.02  0.01  -61.43  13.38  7.46  -5.92 
                        Nestle  Conventional  0.64  0.6  -2.25  0.05  0.08  26.07  32.28  45.76  13.48 
 
Functional  0.69  0.64  -7.9  0.12  0.09  -28.11  101.08  68.08  -33.00 
                        Parmalat  Conventional  0.45  0.48  5.48  0.11  0.12  -4.99  32.06  39.34  7.27 
 
Functional  0.66  0.6  -8.93  0.03  0.02  -51.12  22.14  14.66  -7.48 
                        Muller  Conventional  0.5  0.52  4.24  0.23  0.2  -2.53  92.07  84.13  -7.94 
                        Vipiteno  Conventional  0.36  0.63  72.81  0.12  0.03  -70.33  33.60  17.83  -15.77 
                        PLs  Conventional  0.37  0.65  74.07  0.17  0.06  -62.17  48.00  36.14  -11.85 
                        TOTAL  
 
728.34  613.94  -114.40 
                                   
 
   Table 6.  Impact of health-claims de-labeling on consumers – utility and Welfare  
 




          exp(Ui
de)-exp(Ui
0)  999  -0.0722  1.5413  -43.06  1.4765 
 
Daily Individual Welfare Loss   999  -0.0137  0.2771  -6.0596  1.9586 
 
Annual Average Individual Welfare Loss   -4.9972 
       
Total Welfare Losses   -228.797 
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